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THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND

Professor of Law, University of Michigan

IT has always been a commonplace of politic
Sitates that governments derive their just
the consent of the governed. It is an equ

mental principle that the stability of governme

the confidence of the governed. When those
to governmental action lose faith in governm
and integrity, they are well started on the r
if not social, revolution.

Of the three departments of government,
seems the least likely to develop serious frict

It operates at a distance from individuals.

intelligent citizens know much about its acti

they view them largely as matters of controver

interest. The laws, when passed, seldom bea
large classes of people, because legislation

tremely sensitive to popular wishes.

The executive department is also far remo
daily lives of the mass of people. Except i

participates in legislation, most of its activit
and only rarely does it become a critical poin

tween the government and the governed.
But the judicial department stands in a very d

tion. Every individual is constantly engaged
place against the social, industrial or commer

of others. Actual or potential enemies surround

side. He must fight to hold his job against ot
it, he must fight to protect his wages against

begrudge them, he must fight to preserve his p
a thousand assaults, and he must fight to mai

against those who would exploit it. Every

struggle, every night its anxiety. Few would

stood unaided and alone. But there is one source

and one only-the department of justice. Wit
[386]
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there would be no security. One may never use them

are always there-visible agents of the goddess of J

symbolizes the highest function of the state.
The administration of justice is, therefore, the mos

mental need of society, because through it alone i

are enabled to maintain stable relations with one another and

with the state. It is necessarily the function of government
which most intimately affects the lives of all the people and
is most likely to serve as the test by which they measure gov-

ernmental success or failure.

In view of the enormously important contribution whic

the successful administration of justice can make to the politi
security of the state, it is strange that more systematic and i
telligent efforts have not been directed toward its attainment

in this country. At one period in our history there was a

vigorous movement for reform, which resulted in the enactme

of the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1848. This cod

swept over the newly organizing west, and is the basis for th

practice in many states east of the Mississippi river and
practically every state west of it. But this reform wave im
mediately lost its vigor. The new code was accepted as th
American idea and therefore the last word in procedure.
was never anything more than a timid variation from th
ancient common law procedure of England, and has probab

resulted in very little real improvement in the administration

of justice. Most of the worst features of common law plea
ing were retained, and practically no new idea of first-ra
importance, aside from the general plan of carrying a fe
principles of equity practice over into actions at law, can b
found anywhere among its provisions. It is a hard and rig

system, imposed upon the courts by legislative mandate, leavin

them little freedom of action.

It was doubtless due to the fact that the New York Cod

came into existence just at the time when the western countr

was being settled, and when the newly organized legislatur

were looking for a quick and easy way to put a system of pro

cedure upon their statute books, that it attained such wi
popularity. It was simply copied, grammatical errors and a

by the infant commonwealths of the west, and it may be that

ease of enactment was as strong a recommendation for it

the merits of its provisions.
[387]
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It would be interesting to compute what it cost the people
of New York to attempt to find out from their courts what
the new Code meant. More than one hundred and thirty
volumes of New York practice reports have been published,
containing about 20,000 cases, and if each case represented an
average total cost to the parties and the public of $500.00,
the aggregate cost of these practice decisions would be
$Io,ooo,ooo. These collected cases do not, however, represent
one-tenth, perhaps not one-fiftieth, of the litigation which the

people of New York have been required to endure in their
efforts to obtain a judicial interpretation of the Code

of Civil Procedure.

Picking up at random the last volume of the reports of th

Illinois Supreme Court, which administers common law p
cedure, and comparing it with the last volume of the rep
of the Supreme Court of Indiana, a neighboring state wh

has adopted the New York Code, it appears that the Code pro

vides between two and three times as much litigation o
points of practice as the common law. More comprehen
comparisons would not show greatly different results.

conclusion is fairly justifiable that the one great contributio
which this country has made to simplified procedure has
been a great success.
But the seriousness of the situation in the United States is

due only partly to the enormous direct cost of litigating ques-

tions of practice-a complete economic loss without a single

redeeming feature. A greater injury is suffered by those who
are unable or unwilling to incur the expense of such litigation
and to take the risk of having their cases go off on points o
procedure without a fair decision on the merits, and who fo
that reason are substantially denied the protection of the laws.
It was an old maxim of the common law that wherever there

is a right there is a remedy. A truer statement would revers
the wording, for without a remedy no right has any value. A

Lord Campbell is said to have once put it, "The due distribution of justice depends more upon the rules by which
suits are conducted than on the perfection of the code by
which rights are defined." 1
There is no difference in principle between a decision based
127 Law Journal, 104.
[388]
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upon a contest of procedural skill between two
a decision based upon a contest of strength betwee

champions. We smile when we are told that tr

although actually obsolete, was a lawful method of

in England until abrogated by Parliament only

dred years ago, and we marvel that a sensible nati

long tolerate such an anomaly. But while in Eng
battle existed only in the musty pages of the l

was rediscovered there by accident, in the United S
battle flourishes throughout the length and bread
with the court rooms as the lists, the judges as the
the attorneys, armed with all the weapons of the le

cunning, as the resourceful champions of the p

system which is steadily destroying the confidence
in the public administration of justice.

The characteristic feature of American proced

its legislative origin. This was a wide departu

traditions of the common law. It was the court
not parliament, which created the rules of Eng

They were the product of experience, and were slo

as an expression of the best opinion of the lea
English judiciary. The men who made the rule
men who used them. Every feature was the resu

consideration and grew out of the actual needs of

litigation. There was an adequacy, an appropr
a technical perfection about common law proc
showed the skillful work of highly trained spe
occasionally did Parliament interfere, where so
thought to operate harshly, or some new princi
policy or some novel remedy was thought to be

Parliament never tried to regulate legal practice; it

took to supervise the broad course of its devel
delicate mechanism of litigation was largely left

of those who were expert enough to keep i

adjustment.

When, however, the framing of rules of practice becomes
a matter of general legislation, and a body of men, largely unfamiliar with legal instrumentalities and methods, undertakes
the highly technical task of specifying the details of legal proceedings, an inelastic and inadequate system is inevitable. And
[389]
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it is safe to say that if the American courts had not been able

to resort to the rich store-house of common law procedure

to aid the defects of our statutory codes of practice, a complete
breakdown would have occurred. Procedure is a matter of

organic growth, requiring close attention and constant adjust
ment to keep it operating effectively under perpetually chan

ing conditions. Legislative assemblies, made up, as they ar
largely of laymen, and meeting infrequently, are quite u
fitted for the task of regulating it.

Beyond their inferior quality, legislative codes of pract
have the further fault of extreme rigidity. Most Americ
procedure statutes have undergone little change in the pa

ing years, and even the New York code, that monstrum horr
dum, as Mr. F. R. Coudert has called it,' which became so

bulky and complicated as to be almost unworkable, was only
an exaggerated instance of legislative tinkering with details,
showing no fundamental change of principle or policy in three

quarters of a century. Legislatures are timid about making
important procedural changes, and fear to get beyond their
depth in dealing with matters about which most of their mem-

bers know little or nothing. Furthermore, legislative programs are usually crowded, bills with a strong popular appeal
are given the right of way, and there is little opportunity for

that careful consideration Which is indispensable in successfully framing or adjusting a complicated system of interrelated

rules of practice. Even commissions for revising statutes

usually feel that they must avoid introducing any change sufficiently marked to arouse legislative opposition, lest the whole
enterprise fail.

The legislature is the board of directors of the State, and
its true function is rather to determine policies than to draw
up minute directions for departmental operations. A shop
superintendent would hardly expect to get a satisfactory set
of specifications for an engine, or a workable set of factory
instructions, from the board of directors of his company. No
more should it be expected that a state legislature could make
a practicable set of rules for conducting litigation or keep them
properly revised to meet the needs of a constantly changing

society. Technical processes call for technical knowledge.
1 Certainty and Justice, p. I9.
[390]
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Only at rare intervals, when long suffering from i
legal remedies has aroused the bar of a state to dem
provement, can reform be expected. Under normal

legislative control of legal procedure is sluggish, trivia
tory and unprogressive.

Judicial regulation of legal practice, on the othe
largely escapes the weakness of inferior technical qu
courts constitute the judicial department of the state,
judges who preside and the lawyers who practice in
the selected group of trained men charged with respon
for administering the law. They alone are experienc
actual conduct of litigation, they alone understand the
and effect of the rules, they alone are adequately i

concerning their defects, the opportunities which they

error, and the practical possibilities of improveme

are the only available body of experts in the use of pr
processes. It would seem self-evident that they were b
fied for the actual work of devising, prescribing and
ing remedial rules.

Will judicial regulation also be free from the othe
backs of legislative control, namely, inadequacy of

the tendency to stagnate?

A survey of the history of common law procedu
encouraging in either respect. The chief source of i
was the fact that rules of practice developed only
product of litigation. As cases arose the remedial p
which they presented were worked out in the cours

passage through the courts. Rules grew up at ra

deductions from actual decisions and were limited
fragmentary and casual points as happened to be in
pending actions. There was no authorized method o
alizing the rules, and litigants were obliged to stum
in the dark When no precedent could be found.
feature produced another unfortunate result. The pr

when once established, were treated as binding, so that
new points of practice might freely come up for determ

points once passed upon could not thereafter be cha

the rules approached completeness in detail they becam

in form and binding in effect, and the elasticity, w
made the common law so delicately responsive to c
needs, largely vanished.
[39i]
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But the English genius for administration was equal to the
situation created by the fossilization of common law procedure.
Instead of taking the regulation out of the control of the courts
and thereby losing the benefit of professional skill and experience, England destroyed the intolerable system of procedural

precedents by authorizing the courts to lay down in advance
the rules by which they proposed to regulate civil procedure.
It was a reform of the first magnitude and marked a new era
in judicial development, definitely turning the emphasis from
the past to the future. The fundamental question was no
longer the static one of historical regularity, but the dynamic
question of practical social advantage.
But another problem still remained. The power to regulate
might be ample, the plan of regulation sufficiently broad in its
scope, and the requisite technical skill available, but would
there be sufficient driving force to make the regulation effective? Would it be necessary to provide machinery for keeping the regulators actively at work?
The absolute necessity of such machinery is well demonstrated by a bit of American judicial history. In 1850, before
the enthusiasm for the New York Code had begun to sweep over
the west, Michigan adopted a constitution which both authorized and required the Supreme Court, by general rules, to
establish, modify and amend the practice in such court and in
the Circuit Courts, and to simplify the same.' No greater opportunity for effective regulation by rules of court could be
imagined. But it was eight years before the court promulgated the first set of rules, consisting of 54 Supreme Court
rules, 95 law rules and 120 chancery rules. By I896, a period
of almost forty years, only 10 new Supreme Court rules had
been added, 12 new law rules, and 5 new chancery rules. By
that time a few progressive members of the State Bar Association became so much aroused over the deplorable condition
of the practice that they prepared a complete new set of
rules,2 entirely changing the practice, and this revision was
adopted by the Supreme Court. For eighteen years these
rules remained almost absolutely unchanged, when another
1 Art. VI, Sec. 5.

2 Proceedings Michigan State Bar Ass'n, I896, pp. iii, iv.
[392]
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vigorous demand by a Bar Association committ

sulted in presenting to the Supreme Court a new an

revision, with many strikingly novel features,
court again accepted almost exactly as it was subm
I915 the practice has again settled down to wait
outbreak of reform when conditions shall have b
that they can no longer be endured.
I have been unable to discover who actually dr
first set of Michigan rules in I858, and it may

Supreme Court was the author, since a new broom is

to do effective sweeping. But since I858 the Supr

which was charged in such magnificently broad ter
duty and privilege of controlling procedure by g
has initiated practically nothing for the improveme

practice. The state has been left to the mercy of
mittent efforts of casual Bar Association groups

sional help from the legislature of doubtful quality

What Michigan lacked was a permanent, respons
gressive agency for stimulating action on the p

rule-making power.

England made early provision for this necessa

At first, in 1873, when the new Judicature Act was
power to initiate rules was placed in the entire cour
was so obviously ineffective that in 1876 it was tran

a Rule Committee of six judges. In I894 the Com
changed to include three practicing lawyers and

and changed again in 1899 to include two barristers

tors and four judges. Meetings of the full Comm

place two or three times a year and informal discus

oftener. Barristers, solicitors, law societies, publ
masters and public-spirited laymen are encourage

suggestions for improving the practice.2

The wonderful success which has attended t

court-rule system has not been unobserved in the U

and within a decade New Jersey has completely

1 Proceedings Michigan State Bar Ass'n, 1915, p. I3I. Thi
seems to have made no formal report, but it did in fact com
the rules and drafted a large number of simplified pleading
were adopted by the Supreme Court as a part of the rules.
2 Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority, Ch. III.
[3931
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the common law system of pleading and substituted in its
place a counterpart of that employed in England.' Still more
recently New York attempted to replace the notorious Code
of Civil Procedure by a system of court rules modeled closely
upon the English plan, but the effort unfortunately failed.2

But the last step in the complete development of a workable system of procedure control is yet to be taken in England

and should be taken in the United States. This is the estab-

lishment of a ministry or department of justice with a responsible officer at its head. Every other civilized country
of importance-even such British dominions as Canada and
South Africa-has such a ministry, charged with respon
sibility for affairs of law and justice.' The welfare of the
state is so largely dependent upon the administration o

justice, and this in turn is so complex and so constantly in nee

of the most skillful supervision in order to keep it in touc
with social demands, that the importance of such a govern
mental agency is obvious.
Under such a department the entire court system could b

organized on efficient lines, eliminating conflicting jurisdictio
and the duplication of functions. Proper administrative contro
of dockets, sittings, transfer of causes and assignment of judges
could produce cooperative efficiency with infinite possibilities.

A chief justice or presiding judge, with judicial duties of h
own, can never successfully carry the administrative burde

which a real department of justice involves. The head o

such a department should be responsible to the public, not t
fellow judges, for the proper conduct of the office. He should

not be a member of the court but an outsider who can look at

the affairs of the department objectively. The test of his
success would be the quality of the results obtained, and the
public would not be slow in calling his attention to needed
improvement in the character of the service rendered. Under
a responsible head the department of justice would be expected
1 Laws, 1912, chap. 231, (Law actions); Laws, I915, ch. II6, (Equity

Actions).

2 Civil Practice Act and Rules, prepared by the Board of Statutory Consolidation, I915.

aGaudy, Law Reform. Address delivered at Gray's Inn, I919, published

by the Oxford University Press.
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to render reports of its activities, and instead of

demoralizing American system of allowing the cour

ate year after year with never an accounting, we
velop an intelligible system of judicial data and s
which their performance could be judged and thr
improvements could be suggested and devised. A

mittee consisting of the responsible head of the dep
justice and two judges and two lawyers nominated b
make the administration of justice as efficient as

administration of banking or insurance. Centrali
sibility placed in competent hands is the recogni
need of the time. Nowhere would it produce mor

ing benefits than in the public administration of just
[395]
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